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This Article details the post-statehood controversy between the
Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska Bar Association known as
the "court-bar fight." First, the Article discusses United States v.
Stringer, a 1954 attorney discipline case illustrating the territorial
courts' perceived inability to regulate adequately the legal
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profession. Relying frequently on first-hand interviews by the
author, the Article then outlines the events and personalities
involved in the court-bar fight, focusing on the efforts of Alaska
lawyers to thwart the Alaska Supreme Court's attempt in 1964 to
take over the Alaska Bar Association. The Article concludes that
this conflict represents an example of the difficulties faced by
Alaska lawyers during Alaska's transition into statehood.
I. INTRODUCTION
One hundred years ago a small group of lawyers got together
to form the Alaska Bar Association. It began as a gentleman's club
in Juneau, where admission depended upon the votes of the board
of directors and the payment of a dollar fee. The most severe
discipline was not disbarment but expulsion from the club, and the
only action certain to bring suspension or expulsion was non-
adherence to the minimum fee schedule.1 Much has changed since
this early attempt by Alaska lawyers to exercise some control over
their profession. Rules and regulations of the modern bar dwarf
the clubby association that sprang up in Juneau in 1896. What has
remained the same over the years, however, is the desire of
attorneys to exert some control over their professional lives and to
work in a system that has rules upon which they can depend.
Unfortunately, Alaska's territorial justice system did little to
ensure the predictability and consistency sought by attorneys.
Throughout the territorial years, Congress passed a patchwork of
laws to be applied to Alaska. It was equally inconsistent in
appointing judges to serve on the Alaska bench. The appoint-
ments, often bestowed as a form of political payback, resulted in
judges of wide-ranging abilities and ethical standards. For example,
Judge Arthur Noyes, the first judicial appointment in Nome in
1901, became the linchpin in a scandal to take over the most
valuable gold mining claims in his jurisdiction. At the opposite
extreme, Judge James Wickersham, appointed that same year to
serve in Eagle, became one of Alaska's most venerable jurists and
was later elected Alaska's voteless delegate to Congress.
By the 1950s, attorneys wrestled with a territorial system in
which cases were backed up five years or more, the court calendar
shifted unpredictably and federally appointed jurists sometimes
sacrificed the law for political expediency. Almost equally
1. ARTHUR K. DELANEY, ALASKA BAR AssOCIATION AND SKETCH OF THE
JUDICIARY 33 (1901).
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frustrating to attorneys was the federal court judges' exclusive
power to discipline lawyers. From the territorial lawyers' point of
view, the judiciary needed to be reformed. Searching for ways to
change the judicial system, many lawyers served in the territorial
legislature and helped pass laws. As momentum for statehood
grew, lawyers looked beyond the territorial system and began
working on committees to shape a state judiciary far superior to
anything the territorial system offered.
This Article describes the transitional years from a territorial
justice system to a state court system and the role Alaska lawyers
played in that transition. Part II discusses a pivotal Anchorage
disciplinary case, United States v. Stringer,2 and how it served to
rally lawyers to change the territorial system. Part III details the
escalating tug-of-war between attorneys and judges, even after
statehood, which culminated in the historic legal battle between the
first Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska Bar Association, a
conflict known as the "court-bar fight."
II. THE STRINGER CASE
A lawyer is an officer of the court-a minister in the temple ofjustice. His high calling demands of him fidelity to his clients
with an eye single to their best interests, as well as good faith
and honorable dealings with the courts and the public in general.
-U.S. District Court Judge J.L. McCarrey, quoting a favored
passage in his decision to discipline Anchorage attorney Herald
Stringer.4
When Dwight D. Eisenhower became president in 1952, the
long dormant Alaskan Republican party finally had an opportunity
to recommend its members to appointed territorial posts, including
the Alaska territory's three federal district court judgeships. While
2. 124 F. Supp. 705 (D. Alaska 1954), rev'd 233 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1956).
3. The Stringer case was not the only disciplinary case in Alaska that caused
lawyers to challenge the territorial system. Lawyers in southeast Alaska were
stirred by an equally divisive case against Ketchikan practitioner, W.C. Stump.
U.S. District Court Judge George Folta, sitting in Juneau, heard the case against
Stump. See United States ex reL Fitzgerald v. Stump, 112 F. Supp. 236 (D. Alaska
1953).
4. Stringer, 124 F. Supp. at 715 (quoting People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v.
Green, 187 N.E. 811, 813 (IM. 1933)).
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judgeships at Juneau and Nome filled easily, staffing the Anchorage
bench proved more difficult.'
Anchorage Republican Committeeman and attorney Herald
Stringer searched for a suitable candidate to recommend for the
Third Judicial Division post, but the search wasn't easy because
most of the two dozen or so lawyers in Anchorage were Demo-
crats. Former Anchorage Mayor and fellow Republican John
Manders seemed a likely first choice until Stringer learned of
Manders's philosophical opposition to the income tax. Manders
had refused to pay his income tax for years.6 Eventually, Stringer
settled upon J.L. McCarrey, Jr., a devout Mormon and family man.
McCarrey had come to Alaska in the 1930s to sell stockings and
clothing for the Utah Woolen Mills. He had returned to Utah to
get a law degree and had been practicing law in Alaska since the
1940s.
When Anchorage lawyers failed to endorse McCarrey at a
meeting called for that purpose, Stringer made it clear that if local
lawyers did not support McCarrey, they would lose the opportunity
to help select the judge. Fearing an unknown from another state,
the lawyers reconsidered their vote and endorsed McCarrey by a
narrow margin.
Less than a year later, however, Stringer came to regret his
ardent support of the Republican McCarrey when he found himself
facing the judge, charged in a disciplinary case with unprofessional
conduct.7 In 1953, a client filed a claim against Stringer for billing
more than $2,000 to obtain a dismissal of the client's case without
trial. The client alleged that the exorbitant sum was payment for
Stringer's influence with the court.8 In the absence of an indepen-
5. Judge George W. Folta, appointed May 7,1947, remained the judge for the
First Judicial Division and Judge Joseph Earl Cooper was appointed July 17, 1952,
while Congress was in recess, to the Second Judicial Division bench in Nome.
6. Senior U.S. District Court Judge James M. Fitzgerald remembered being
told by a U.S. Justice Department official that John Manders did not pay his
income tax. Manders was one of a number of people in territorial Alaska who
balked at paying national taxes. Telephone Interview with James M. Fitzgerald,
Senior Judge, U.S. District Court (Nov. 1995).
7. Stringer, 124 F. Supp. at 706.
8. A taxi cab driver, Robert Kemp, came to the U.S. Attorney's office
complaining that he had given Stringer $2,000 worth of promissory notes in
addition to $500 paid up front to cover the legal fee in a white slavery case. The
charges, arising from Kemp's alleged transportation of a prostitute from one bar
to the next and picking up passengers who were potential clients, had been
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dent, integrated bar association to look discreetly into potential
lawyer misconduct, all Alaska cases went directly to the U.S.
Attorney's office for investigation, then to the grand jury for
indictment and finally to the territorial court for adjudication.
The Stringer case was mishandled from the start. An overzeal-
ous Assistant U.S. Attorney pushed it through to the grand jury?
An outraged grand jury threatened to increase the charge from
unprofessional conduct to larceny by false pretenses.'0 Then
Judge McCarrey refused to drop the case, even though a new
Assistant U.S. Attorney, James M. Fitzgerald, evaluated the case
and told Judge McCarrey that he did not feel it should be prosecut-
ed." At this point, the case was no longer just a disciplinary
matter, but an opportunity for Judge McCarrey to show the
Anchorage community that he offered no special favors in his
courtroom.
Anchorage lawyers, smelling a lynching, rallied behind
Stringer. Some served as witnesses, others as counsel. Despite his
dismissed for lack of evidence. Kemp insisted he agreed to pay Stringer $2,000
because Stringer implied that it would cost that amount to keep the case from
going to trial. See id. at 706-13.
9. Stringer was originally handled by Assistant U.S. Attorney Arthur David
Talbot. According to Talbot:
I wasn't going to take Kemp's word for anything. So, I used the U.S.
Attorney's favorite tool. I ran the whole thing before a grand jury. That
way, I could get Kemp under oath, get the evidence. After doing that I
was satisfied that a complaint should be made, a disciplinary complaint
against Mr. Stringer.
I think really it could have been handled informally and maybe
would be today.
10. According to Talbot, the grand jury believed Talbot was covering up for
Stringer: "[F]rom the evidence they heard they wanted to indict Herald for larceny
by false pretenses." Even Talbot thought this was excessive and, instead, sent an
information to his boss, U.S. Attorney Seaborn Buckalew, charging Stringer with
unprofessional conduct. Talbot, uneasy with the time Buckalew was taking to
consider signing the information, told Buckalew that
[the] Grand Jury was hotter than a two-dollar pistol, and that they had
been trying to draw their own indictment against Herald Stringer. ...
You know, if they indict anybody over this, it isn't going to be me
because I've done what I told them I'd do. The ball's in your court.
11. Fitzgerald reinterviewed the complaining witness, Kemp, and found him
to be completely unreliable. As far as Fitzgerald could tell, Kemp had been
unhappy with Stringer's fee and complained to his boss, the owner of his cab
company, who had recommended Stringer to him. It was the owner of the cab
company who allegedly told Kemp that the money must be going to take care of
the judge. Telephone Interview with James M. Fitzgerald, supra note 6.
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political ties to Stringer, McCarrey refused to disqualify himself
from hearing the case, claiming that he remained on the case at the
urging of defense counsel and the U.S. Attorney's office. 12
McCarrey declared that his judicial duty "must transcend all
personal emotion and human desires, and it must discharge its
moral obligation based upon the law as applied to the facts in this
case."13 He dispensed with Stringer's witnesses, proclaiming them
"exceedingly well rehearsed" and therefore not worthy of much
weight.'4 Judge McCarrey found no evidence that Stringer had
bribed or inappropriately influenced a government official. 5
However, McCarrey did find Stringer guilty of overreaching by
charging an excessive fee 6 and sentenced him to a relatively harsh
120-day suspension from practicing law.'7
The Stringer case galvanized Anchorage lawyers already
frustrated with the territorial court's inefficiencies. The court's
backlog could delay even minor cases for five years. Even if a case
got before a judge, results were uncertain. "Eventually, there were
two factions formed," said Edgar Paul Boyko, who came to
Anchorage from the east coast in the early 1950s.
The purists ... who said, "Okay, McCarrey's totally incompe-
tent, you can't even reason with that man."... And the people
like myself who said, "Hey, we've got an obligation to our client.
It's true you can't practice law in front of McCarrey, but you
certainly can use child psychology." And I did. And I kept
winning cases.
Roger Cremo, who in later years developed a specialty in
banking law and represented the First National Bank of Anchor-
age, found McCarrey "utterly unsuited" to the bench. Although
McCarrey knew Cremo's opinion, Cremo found this did not hurt
him in court:
Strangely enough he was aware of it, [and] he went out of his
way to see that I did well in his courtroom. I couldn't lose. The
only case I did lose was a jury trial and he turned it around [with
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict]. He bent over back-
wards. He was trying to show the world that he did not resent
my opposition. 8
12. Stringer, 124 F. Supp. at 707.
13. Id. at 716.
14. Id. at 712.
15. Id. at 713.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 716.
18. Telephone Interview with Roger Cremo, attorney (Dec. 26, 1995).
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The Stringer case hit a nerve among Alaska lawyers. The issue
of whether Stringer actually overreached was dwarfed in impor-
tance by how the matter was handled. It demonstrated how little
power lawyers had in the territorial legal system; they were forced
to have both their cases and professional conduct judged by a jurist
for whom they had little respect.
III. THE COURT-BAR FIGHT
In the 1955 territorial legislative session-the session immedi-
ately following Stringer's conviction-Speaker of the House
Wendell Kay, who also happened to be Stringer's counsel,
introduced a bill creating a territorial bar association with the
power to investigate disciplinary cases. Not surprisingly, the
legislature, more than half of whom were lawyers, passed the
Alaska Integrated Bar Act of 1955."9
Having achieved professional independence with the passage
of the Integrated Bar Act, Alaska's lawyers next focused on the
judiciary. Attorneys dominated the judiciary committee at the
constitutional convention held at Fairbanks in 1955.2' The
convention, a concerted effort by Alaskans to persuade Congress
to grant Alaska statehood, met to hammer out a framework of laws
to govern the prospective state. Upon the committee's recommen-
dation, the convention adopted the Missouri Plan for selecting
judges.2 In place of popular election, the system dictated that
practitioners would evaluate their fellow lawyers under consider-
ation for judicial posts. A judicial council, relying upon the
evaluations, would provide the governor with a pool from which to
select appointees.22 The Alaska Bar Association would appoint
three lawyer-members to the seven-member judicial council.'
19. 1955 Alaska Sess. Laws 196. Passage of the Integrated Bar Act came too
late to help Herald Stringer, whose case had already been appealed. Stringer v.
United States, 233 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1956).
20. Anchorage lawyer George McLaughlin headed the committee, which
included Thomas C. Harris, Maurice Johnson, Irwin L. Metcalf, Ralph Rivers,
R.E. Robertson and Warren A. Taylor. See VICTOR FISCHER, ALASKA'S
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 268 app. D (1975).
21. Id. at 113.
22. Id. at 113-14.
23. Under the proposal, the seven-member judicial council would include three
lawyers, three laypersons and the chief justice, who would act only in the event of
a deadlock. Id. at 114. One advisory group to the constitutional convention found
that this system went
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When Congress passed the Alaska Statehood Act in 1958,24
lawyers saw an end to years of an inept and inefficient territorial
judicial system. In anticipation of a new state judiciary, they began
the process of selecting lawyers to represent their views on the
judicial council.
Each of the three major Alaska judicial divisions-Anchorage,
Fairbanks and Southeast-was to have a member on the judicial
council. The constitution was silent, however, on the question of
how the Alaska Bar Association was to choose these lawyers. In
Anchorage, attorneys Buell Nesbett, Edward Davis, Ralph Cottis
and James Fitzgerald proposed a democratic system involving
nominations, ballots and votes, with provisions for a run-off in case
of no clear majority. Juneau's Frank Doogan suggested to the
Anchorage Bar Association that local bar associations establish a
statewide system for selecting judicial council members.' Howev-
er, before the local bars could come to an agreement, the Alaska
Bar Association's board of governors took it out of their hands.26
a long way toward withdrawing the judicial branch from the control of
the people of this state and placing it under that of the organized bar.
No state constitution has ever gone this far in placing one of the three
coordinate branches of the government beyond the reach of democratic
controls. We feel that in its desire to preserve the integrity of the courts,
the convention has gone farther than is necessary or safe in putting them
in the hands of a private professional group, however public-spirited its
members may be.
Id. at 116.
24. Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958).
25. See, e.g., ALASKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, MINUTES OF THE DAILY
PROCEEDINGS, ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 731 (1965). The
discussion of this issue at the constitutional convention included the following
exchange:
V. RIVERS: I see that on the basis of area representation, the
governing body of the organized state bar, not the membership, shall
select the appointees from the legal side. Is there some reason why these
are not selected from the membership of the organized state bar, rather
than by their governing body?
MCLAUGHLIN: The intent was that there would be in existence or
be created, a body which would be representative of all persons admitted
to practice, and they would lay down the rules by which the governing
body would designate people to the judicial council. It doesn't preclude
election, it is determined on majority vote of the membership. The
mechanics we felt should not be spelled out in the constitution.
Id.
26. The Alaska Integrated Bar Act of 1955, 1955 Alaska Sess. Laws 196,
created the Alaska Bar Association, a territory-wide association that governed the
profession. Lawyers throughout Alaska elected representatives to sit on the board
of governors. In 1959, the board of governors included the following: Wilfred C.
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In 1959, the board of governors met in Nome and "acted in a
way that had never been anticipated," said retired superior court
judge Thomas Stewart, who had helped draft both the constitution
and the Integrated Bar Act. The board's appointments to the
state's first judicial council would have packed the court system
with judges sympathetic to plaintiffs. The deal cut in Nome
provided that Ernie Bailey of Ketchikan, Robert Parrish of
Fairbanks and Herald Stringer of Anchorage would serve as the
lawyer-members of the judicial council. These lawyers-two of
whom had extensive plaintiff-oriented practices and the third of
whom was friendly with the bar's personal injury faction-would
have easily overpowered the judicial council's three lay members
with block votes and presented the governor with a group of
ideologically identical judicial candidates. But for some very
unhappy board members and some outraged lawyers in Anchorage,
the board of governors would have gotten away with this power
grab.
Edward Davis presided over a meeting of the Anchorage bar
at the Loussac Library in downtown Anchorage. Angry lawyers
threatened to convene a special meeting to recall the board of
governors if the board did not withdraw the judicial council
candidates. Buell Nesbett and James Fitzgerald were dispatched to
talk to Herald Stringer, the Anchorage candidate for the judicial
council. Stringer agreed to take himself out of the running,
provided that his former partner and board of governor member
John Connolly not be censured for his part in the attempt to pack
the first courts.27
The Anchorage bar voted to submit Buell Nesbett's and
Raymond Plummer's names to the board of governors to replace
Stringer. Although there was some effort in Fairbanks and
Southeast to switch judicial council candidates, only the Anchorage
candidate was changed. Raymond Plummer joined Ernie Bailey
Stump, president, Ketchikan; James A. von der Heydt, vice president, Nome; John
R. Connolly, second vice president, Anchorage; Wendell P. Kay, secretary,
Anchorage; William V. Boggess, Fairbanks; Clifford J. Groh, Anchorage; Robert
L. Jernberg, Ketchikan; Robert McNealy, Fairbanks; and M.E. Monagle, Juneau.
While the Alaska Bar Association and its board of governors began providing
for territory-wide organization in 1955, lawyers continued to meet regularly at
semi-formal local bar association gatherings. The Juneau, Ketchikan, Anchorage,
Valdez, Nome and Tanana Valley Bar Associations had been in operation for
many years prior to the passage of the Integrated Bar Act.
27. Telephone Interview with James M. Fitzgerald, supra note 6.
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and Robert Parrish as the third lawyer-member of the judicial
council. This addition paved the way for Edward Davis to be
appointed superior court judge in Anchorage and Buell Nesbett to
become the first chief justice of the Alaska Supreme Court.2
With statehood a reality and the formation of the state court
system underway,29 it was time to get down to the business of
practicing law. Lawyers appointed to the bench from Alaska's legal
community improved the standard of practice; the backlog of cases
before the court began to ease, and new judges expressed a
growing impatience with courtroom shenanigans. Old-time lawyers
struggled to keep pace, while younger bar members expected
prompt motions hearings and reasonably scheduled cases.
Although lawyers appreciated the reforms to the judicial
system, the public began questioning the bar's ability to police its
own members. The rash of suspensions following statehood slowed
to a trickle as disciplinary committees in some cities became
bogged down with more work than they could handle. Dissatisfied
consumers began petitioning the state legislature to address the
inability of lawyers to resolve disciplinary complaints. State
legislators, in turn, began to reexamine the place of the integrated
bar in the new scheme of state government. The Integrated Bar
Act had set up an autonomous bar association, whose power was
not constrained by the democratic checks and balances characteris-
tic of typical governmental entities. Thus, in response to public
concerns about the bar's disciplinary authority, legislators began
introducing a series of bills to modify the Integrated Bar Act, the
first of which would have placed the bar in the executive branch.
In February 1963, lawyers on the board of governors lobbied
discreetly to oppose Senate Bill 61, a proposal that would have
placed the bar in the executive branch and transformed the bar's
governors into administrative appointees.5 0 Concluding that it still
28. The first supreme court justices were Chief Justice Buell A. Nesbett and
Associate Justices John H. Dimond and Walter H. Hodge.
29. The following judges were appointed to the first state court bench: James
A. von der Heydt, Presiding Judge, First District, Juneau; Water E. Walsh, Judge,
First District, Ketchikan; Hubert A. Gilbert, Presiding Judge, Second District,
Nome; Edward V. Davis, Presiding Judge, Third District, Anchorage; J. Earl
Cooper, Judge, Third District, Anchorage; James M. Fitzgerald, Judge, Third
District, Anchorage; Everett W. Hepp, Judge, Fourth District, Fairbanks. See 1960
Alaska Sess. Laws VI.
30. Alaska Bar Ass'n, Minutes of the Board of Governors' Meeting (Feb, 9,
1963) (unpublished, on file with the Alaska Bar Ass'n) (discussing S. 61).
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had enough influential members in the state legislature, the bar's
leadership sought to avoid a more public confrontation. The board
depended upon Fairbanks lawyer Robert McNealy, who was also
Majority Leader in the Alaska Senate, to express tactfully its
opposition to Senate Bill 61.Y'
The issue would not die, however, and the board soon faced
a more challenging opponent, Chief Justice Buell Nesbett. Dealing
with Chief Justice Nesbett required more delicate maneuvering
than dealing with the legislature. Nesbett, champion of bar
independence in the 1950s, now championed the judiciary's
independence. This veteran attorney, whom the bar had confident-
ly endorsed in 1960 as the first supreme court justice, displayed the
same intractable will that had previously endeared him to the bar.
Since the age of sixteen, when he left his mother's and
stepfather's home, Nesbett had acted decisively to shape his life.
He put himself through school, traveled around the world as a
radio operator, served as a probation and parole officer in San
Francisco, headed his law school class and achieved the rank of full
commander in the Navy before any of his fellow officers. In 1945,
discharged from the Navy and recently divorced, he turned down
a job in the prestigious San Francisco firm of Pillsbury, Madison
and Sutro and decided instead to head for Alaska.
The thirty-five-year-old Nesbett arrived in Anchorage and
took an immediate liking to the city, where no elite lawyers or
firms fixed the bar to one manner of practice. Although Nesbett
enjoyed the informality of Alaska's practice, he did his best not to
let it interfere with his own sense of how things should be done.
When faced with the possibility of waiting two years for bar exam
results, he convinced the examiners to adopt a more systematic
process and organized a letter-writing campaign to get his results
promptly. Teaming with solo practitioner Stanley McCutcheon, the
youngest member of a politically active Alaska family and early
proponent of statehood, Nesbett gained entry into the ranks of
Anchorage's growing hierarchy.
Of the approximately ten lawyers practicing in Anchorage
when Nesbett arrived, he was clearly among the best. But it was
not just the practice of law that Nesbett embraced. He took just as
enthusiastically to other great Alaskan pastimes: hunting, fishing,
flying and drinking. His flying career ended in 1971, when a severe
31. Id.
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plane crash left him with a fused left ankle, little mobility in his
right forearm and blinded in one eye. His drinking career ended
even earlier. When interviewed in 1983, Nesbett said:
The tendency is to drive yourself. If you worked hard on a case,
you'd drive yourself and have a tendency to have a drink and
work harder. Pretty soon you get to depending on it. [I] got to
trying lots of cases and working hard and drinking [hard]. I
finally reached a point where I said, "Hell, this is no life for me.
I got to quit it." So, I did.
Nesbett tackled drinking with the same ferocity he tackled
everything else. In 1953, he went dry, determined to cut alcohol
out of his life. People recall seeing a transformation in his
personality. He was no longer so mellow or easygoing.
This transformation in Nesbett did not seem to bother an
Anchorage bar that itself was undergoing a transition from an
informal territorial practice to a more organized and efficient group
of professionals determined to shape their future legal system.
Elected president of the Anchorage Bar Association in the 1950s,
Nesbett spearheaded a drive to convince Congress not to reappoint
U.S. District Court Judge J.L. McCarrey to the Anchorage bench.
Anchorage lawyers' efforts to block McCarrey's renomination
succeeded.
Although Nesbett did not serve at the constitutional conven-
tion in 1955, he did ensure that the Anchorage bar received daily
reports from the committee writing the judiciary article. Under
Nesbett's leadership, the Anchorage bar set up committees on
various aspects of judicial reorganization: inferior courts, judicial
salaries, retirement, budget, jurisdiction areas and venue. Nesbett,
along with other Alaska lawyers, long subservient to the federal
system of appointments, could now wield power over the new
judiciary.
During his first year as chief justice, Nesbett organized the
state court system. His administrative abilities helped to make a
success of a state court that had started with no money and no
viable predecessor. Nesbett successfully implemented the novel
concept of an electronic recording system in place of court
reporters because a shortage of court reporters in Alaska made
electronic recording invaluable. He also championed the controver-
sial notion of setting up supreme court headquarters in Anchorage
[Vol. 13:1
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rather than Juneau, the state capital.32 His ideas had some
opposition, but as fellow Justice John Dimond observed, "He was
commander of a destroyer during the war [and] he had some of
that concept of authority as chief justice."
In 1963, after three years as chief justice, Nesbett placed
himself squarely in the middle of one of the most sensitive issues
involving the Alaska Bar Association. Nesbett used the facts of In
re Houston33 to establish his position on where the Alaska bar
belonged in the scheme of state government.
In that case, Clyde Houston, an experienced trial lawyer,
applied for bar membership on reciprocity from the State of
Washington. The Alaska Bar Association denied his request,
insisting he take a bar exam?4 The Alaska Supreme Court
reversed the board's decision and admitted Houston to practice
before the court.35 The supreme court cited its "inherent and final
power and authority to determine the standards for admission to
the practice of law.",36 The board viewed the decision as stating
that the supreme court had "inherent and final power" not only to
admit but also to punish or disbar lawyers.37
A month later, in March 1963, Chief Justice Nesbett confirmed
the board's suspicions by suggesting to the board that the bar be
administered by the judiciary. Board president Robert Ziegler
supported this request and proposed introducing a resolution at the
bar association's next convention to place "the Alaska bar under
the Judiciary by judicial rule., 31
That same month, Alaska Senate Resolution 39 called for
placing the bar under the judiciary. Passage of this resolution,
entitled "Relating to the preparation of rules by the Supreme Court
to place the Alaska Bar Association in the judicial branch," on
32. Justice Walter H. Hodge, originally part of the court, bought a house in
Juneau, hoping that the court would be there. Hodge eventually applied for the
federal court post and left the supreme court. Justice Harry 0. Arend replaced
him.
33. 378 P.2d 644 (Alaska 1963).
34. Id. at 644.
35. Id. at 647.
36. Id. at 645.
37. Alaska Bar Ass'n, Minutes of the Board of Governors' Meeting (Mar. 11,
1963) (unpublished, on file with the Alaska Bar Ass'n).
38. Id.
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March 19, 1963, upstaged any vote the Alaska Bar Association
planned on Chief Justice Nesbett's proposal.39
The supreme court, by now accustomed to taking administra-
tive matters in hand, gave Anchorage attorney Burton Biss the task
of examining the disciplinary rules of bar associations around the
country and drafting appropriate rules for Alaska. Biss spent "all
of a good day on it," and recommended streamlining the disciplin-
ary procedure. The rules were first published for comments in
January 1964. Because the Juneau bar responded favorably to the
rules, while the Anchorage bar reacted sharply against them, the
board of governors reserved its opinion, approaching the issue
warily.
Nesbett, sensing resistance to the proposed rules prepared by
Biss, had his administrative director of courts, Thomas Stewart,
review them. Stewart compared various states' bar rules and
determined that Biss had made the Michigan rules his primary
model but had excluded a crucial step relating to the disciplinary
process. In Michigan, a three-judge panel from lower courts
prepared initial findings, while the supreme court served only as an
appellate body. Biss's scheme left out the special panel, making
the supreme court the sole arbiter.
Stewart told Nesbett that the rules left the supreme court too
involved in the disciplinary procedure. They also provided for no
appellate procedure. He suggested the court use the Michigan
format with some minor alterations, still leaving the supreme court
in an appellate role. Nesbett refused this advice.
39. See S. Res. 39, 3d Leg., 1st Sess., 1963 Alaska Sess. Laws 162. The
resolution read as follows:
Whereas the Courts of many states, including the Supreme Court of
the State of Alaska, have held that attorneys are officers of the court and
their qualifications and fitness to practice law before the courts is a
matter for final determination by the Supreme Court; and
Whereas the Alaska Integrated Bar Act... raises the question of
whether the Board of Governors of the Alaska Bar Association as
presently constituted is a part of the executive or judicial branch of
government;
Be it resolved that the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska with
the assistance of the Judicial Council and the Alaska Bar Association is
respectfully requested to prepare suggested rules placing the Alaska Bar
Association in the judicial branch of government and report its actions
and recommendations, together with recommendations for any necessary
legislative action consistent with its determinations, to the legislature at
the time of the convening of the second session in 1964.
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On April 7, 1964, eleven days after the Good Friday earth-
quake devastated much of southcentral Alaska, the Alaska
Supreme Court published the new bar rules. Anchorage lawyers,
preoccupied with the earthquake damage, treated the court
proclamation with more than its usual diffidence. Two weeks after
the court issued the bar rules, Wendell Kay raised the matter for
consideration at the weekly Monday luncheon meeting of the
Anchorage bar. Arthur David Talbot recalled:
[Kay said,] "You fellows have all gotten this great big thick thing
in the mail from the Supreme Court which purports to be a
proposed set of rules for the bar association. Has anybody read
it?" The thing was too bulky, nobody had read it. Wendell said,
"Well, we'd better have a committee read the thing and see
what's in it. I'll appoint Dave Talbot and myselt a committee
of two." He said, "Dave, you read it." So I went home and
found my copy and I read the thing, and I was horrified. It was
a purported takeover by the Supreme Court of Alaska of our
statutory bar association. It abolished the statutory bar and
created a new bar association as part of the supreme court. It
was right off the wall and right out of the blue.
Talbot called Kay and told him, "We're in trouble."
Talbot figured the court promulgated these bar rules because
of the dilatory handling of grievance matters in Ketchikan and
Fairbanks. Talbot, who had been the original Assistant U.S.
Attorney to bring disciplinary charges against Herald Stringer in
the fated 1950s case, had, by the 1960s, mellowed considerably.
When a disciplinary matter came to his attention as head of
Anchorage's grievance committee, he followed a discreet proce-
dure. He would call the attorney in question, see him after work
hours and tell him about the problem. "With any luck at all, by
five the next night there is no more problem," said Talbot. "You
straighten it out with his client, with his opponent, or with the
judge. You make a little note for the file, mark it closed, and go
on to something else." But in Ketchikan and Fairbanks grievance
matters could go on for years. According to Talbot, Chief Justice
Nesbett "was getting letters daily from irate citizens."
In February 1964, two months before the bar rules were
promulgated, the board of governors had anticipated the possibility
of new bar rules and had spoken of the need for "calm, cool,
positive action" that would not deteriorate into anything "heated
or aimless."'  The board established a committee to write
40. Alaska Bar Ass'n, Minutes of the Board of Governors' Meeting (Feb. 9,
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legislation and lobby the legislature. In May, after promulgation of
the rules, bar president David Thorsness met with Nesbett to
determine whether the rules could be modified. His overtures were
met with "complete indifference."'" 'Two days after Thorsness's
disheartening report, incoming bar president Robert Ziegler
appointed Wendell Kay, David Talbot, Eugene Wiles, Richard
McVeigh and George Boney to a committee in charge of retaining
counsel and writing an opinion regarding the institution of a suit in
federal court if the rules were put into effect. Also in May,
members of the Alaska Bar Association voted to reject the bar
rules and authorized the board to disregard them. Nevertheless, on
June 1, 1964, the supreme court activated the bar rules with
Supreme Court Order No. 64, the first of a series of supreme court
orders that culminated in a full legal battle between the court and
the Alaska Bar Association.42
Although Senate Resolution 39 had empowered Nesbett to
place the bar association under the judicial branch, he proceeded
in a manner that did not countenance discussion or compromise.
Nesbett not only threatened the bar's independence, but offended
its sense of fairness. His autocratic order angered, above all, the
Anchorage bar. "Nesbett wanted to be the man on the white horse
after he became chief justice, but he hadn't been a man on a white
horse up until that time and the other lawyers knew that," recalled
Anchorage attorney Kenneth R. Atkinson. It was the Anchorage
bar that remembered the hard drinking years and the fierce
sobriety that followed. Not only was the Anchorage bar intimately
aware of Nesbett's foibles, but Nesbett was well aware of the
faction of the Anchorage bar that loved a good fight.
Some twenty years later, Nesbett said:
Frankly I was never, to put it bluntly, in the same boat with
Wendell [Kay] or with any of those fellas .... I always held back
because I didn't approve of some of the things they'd laugh
about and do in their practice and the way they'd handle things
and the way they did politics even. And yet I never was such a
square that I'd come out and tangle with them on it. I just
stayed away from them to a certain extent and they sensed it
and resented it I guess. I know Wendell resented not being
1964) (unpublished, on file with the Alaska Bar Ass'n).
41. Alaska Bar Ass'n, Minutes of the Board of Governors' Meeting (May 7,
1964) (unpublished, on file with the Alaska Bar Ass'n).
42. See, e.g., In re Supreme Court Orders No. 64, 68, 69,70 & 71, 395 P.2d 853
(Alaska 1964) (per curiam).
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president of the Anchorage Bar Association instead of me. But
the fellas came to me instead of him.
Still, Nesbett reflected:
When Wendell would go on a big drunk, Mary (his secretary)
would be the first one to come around to my office at the First
National Bank with some files and say, "He's due in court at 10
and it's 9:30." And I'd always go in and handle his cases for him
and take care of it.
The board of governors signaled its intention not to abide by
the rules as promulgated. Board member Charles Clasby wrote
Nesbett, specifically telling the chief justice that he did not consider
himself a member of the board under the auspices of a supreme
court. Nesbett decided to poll other board members. Justice John
Dimond advised against the poll, warning that it would invite
members to articulate and, thereby, harden their dissent. Justice
Arend apparently agreed with Nesbett about the poll because it
was sent out in July.43 No one responded.
On July 23, 1964, Nesbett, interpreting the board of governors'
silence as a refusal to serve under the new rules, determined that
the Alaska Bar Association had no governing body. He then
issued Supreme Court Orders No. 68, 69 and 70, placing the bar
under the temporary trusteeship of the Alaska Supreme Court.
The court removed the bar's board of governors and ordered all
the association's assets into the custody of the supreme court. The
court seized the bar's property and funds, along with all bar
records, so that the court could oversee the bar's administrative
duties.
The bar's files, which filled all of two or three file cabinets,
were taken into custody. However, Alaska bar president Robert
Ziegler, foreseeing a "raid on the treasury," had sent much of the
bar's funds to an account in Ketchikan. He left only a token
amount in the original account at the First National Bank of
Anchorage. The court ordered Ziegler to deliver these funds.
43. In a 1964 newspaper article, Alaska bar president Robert Ziegler was
reported to have said that the court apparently took this action as a result of a poll
among the board of governors in which
we had a choice of being hung or poisoned. The unilateral action of the
Supreme Court either jeopardizes or destroys the Alaska Bar Association
as legislatively constituted. I regret very much the fact that the Supreme
Court has taken the action that it has. And I doubt there can be found
within the state of Alaska nine attorneys who will voluntarily serve on a
re-constituted board of governors.
Bar Funds Taken at Gun Point, ANCHORAGE TIMES, July 24, 1964, at 1.
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Court administrator Thomas Stewart drew up the writ of sequestra-
tion and was then directed by Nesbett to serve the writ on the bank
and move the bar's money to a trust account.
Stewart and a trooper went to the First National Bank after
business hours and handed the writ to the cashier. The cashier had
the bank's attorney, Roger Cremo, look over the writ. Stewart
vividly remembered the following sequence: "[Cremo] said, 'I'm not
really sure of the legality of this, and I'm not sure what our
response should be. Do you mind if I consider it overnight?' I
said, 'Well, no. We'll come back in the morning, that's fine."'
When Stewart reported that Cremo had asked for an extension
of time, Nesbett was extremely upset. Stewart and the trooper
went back before business hours the next morning, and the cashier
had the check ready for them. But before he would deliver the
check, the cashier said he had to call Mr. Cremo. According to
Stewart:
The cashier talked with Cremo and he turned to the officer and
said, "Do you have a gun?" The officer kind of looked at me
and I looked at him and, as I recall, kind of shrugged. I didn't
know whether he had a gun or not. He said, "Yes."
The cashier reported that the trooper had a gun, and Cremo asked
whether the trooper had showed it to him. The cashier replied that
he had not. Stewart continued:
Roger said, "Well, have him show it to you." So the cashier said
to the officer, "Can I see your gun?" So he opened up his coat
and he had a gun in the shoulder holster. He wasn't in uniform.
He closed his coat back up again and the cashier spoke to Roger
[over the telephone] and told him what happened, and Roger
said, "Has he pulled his gun?" The cashier responded that he
hadn't and Cremo said something like, "We don't think it's legal
unless we're forced to, and ask him to pull his gun." So, he
pulled it out.
Cremo then asked the cashier to have the trooper point the gun at
him. The trooper "turned it to him with his hand outside the
trigger guard." Finally, "Roger said, 'Well, give him the check."'
Check in hand, Stewart set up the trust account. Within "half an
hour, forty-five minutes, the newspaper was on the street-'Court
Takes Bar Funds at Gunpoint.' It was totally a set up ... to
embarrass the court," said Stewart.'
Cremo denied setting up Stewart. "There are only two ways to
get money from a bank," said Cremo more than thirty years later,
44. See id.
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"by force or a writ and that writ was completely invalid." Al-
though Cremo did not call the newspapers, he did relate the
incident to one or two colleagues, and the call was made.45
The news didn't stop with the Anchorage Times. When
Stewart reached New York a few days later for a meeting of the
National Association of Court Administrators, he found the
newspapers there were reporting the same story. "Why did the
court use a gun to take bar funds?" he was asked time and again.
It was difficult to explain the situation in Alaska to the New York
bar.
The court had taken fast authoritative action; the bar had
maneuvered politically. By the end of July, the activists were able
to rally the rest of the bar to their cause. The Alaska Bar
Association hired counsel and brought suit against the Alaska
Supreme Court, the individual members of the court and the court
administrator. 4'
The court had less freedom than the board to maneuver and
take decisive political action. Still, it found one ally: Alaska Senate
Majority Leader and Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee
Robert McNealy. In a letter dated a day after the July 23
takeover, Nesbett thanked McNealy, the only lawyer in the senate,
for supporting a number of bills that would have curbed the bar.
Nesbett wrote McNealy:
The Anchorage Bar Association went so far as to create a
special committee with one main responsibility-that of causing
legislation to be introduced of a type which would harass the
supreme court and which might possibly create a rift between
the legislature and the court over the Alaska Bar Rules.
Nesbett also praised McNealy's "high sense of public duty and [his]
willingness and unique ability to advise [his] fellow Senators of the
true facts."'47
Nesbett's letter to McNealy coincided with an announcement
by the Anchorage bar that it intended to poll legislative candidates
on how they felt about the supreme court instituting jury costs.
The court required a bond of no more than thirty dollars to be paid
by the losing party in a civil case in order to pay for a jury. The
45. Telephone Interview with Roger Cremo, supra note 18.
46. Alaska Bar Ass'n v. Nesbett, No. A-42-64 CIV. (D. Alaska filed July 29,
1964).
47. Letter from Buell Nesbett, Chief Justice, Alaska Supreme Court, to Robert
McNealy, Majority Leader, Alaska Senate (July 24, 1964).
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trial judge could waive the rule for anyone without funds.
Opponents-many of whom also opposed Nesbett's takeover of the
bar-claimed the order was another highhanded scheme by the
supreme court and an abridgment of the constitutional right to a
jury trial. The supreme court, realizing the potential harm that
could come from encouraging candidates for the legislature to
debate the court's order, issued its own press release.
The supreme court explained that although the Alaska
Constitution guaranteed the right to a jury trial, it did not require
that the taxpayers foot the bill. Since the supreme court was
operating on a shoestring, any provisions that defrayed jury costs
would help it cope with other administrative matters and also
curtail abuses of the jury system, such as using the demand for a
jury to delay a trial or delaying settlement until a party could assess
whether the jury would be favorably disposed to the claim.
Plaintiff's personal injury attorneys, "who often advance the costs
of their clients' suit in return for a percentage of the recovery,"
were the primary opponents of the fee, the supreme court told the
public.
When interviewed later, Nesbett recalled:
In running the Anchorage bar for five years, I observed that the
most active members and the ones that showed up regularly
were the aggressive plaintiff's lawyers. Because they are
aggressive and that's the way they practice law, rough and tough
in court, because that's the way they win cases. So, when they
took out after the court it was hammer and tongs.
There was little countervailing influence, according to Nesbett,
because the "fat cat defense lawyers that represent the insurance
companies" were apathetic. Nesbett also added that they did not
attend meetings of the Anchorage bar in any numbers. He
recalled:
If you've got 25 percent of the bar behind you in those days
you'd know you're all right because nobody else showed any
interest. Davis and Renfrew, which is now Hughes Thorsness
and so on, Plummer and Delaney, all those are just busy
representing insurance companies at $75 an hour, they really
didn't take much of an interest in the bar, they didn't in those
days. So, apathy was one of the problems you had to contend
with in trying to get something, to get the bar behind something
as a whole.
The press release made an additional threat to personal injury
lawyers: "The court may next consider a court rule for Alaska
requiring that copies of all contingent fee contracts between
attorneys and clients be filed with the trial court as is done in New
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York." After judgment, the trial court would review the terms of
the contingent fee contract to determine whether it was fair to the
client, in "light of the amount of work performed by the attorney."
The proposal infuriated plaintiff's lawyers.
It was war, and the only way the court could attack the
attorneys at this stage was in its orders and press releases. Nesbett
did not consider these devices to be manipulative. Later, he
commented:
When you're put in a position to make decisions, like the court
was, you don't run to the people and ask them how to decide
cases or appeals.... It was rough there for quite a while. But
I felt that that was the right thing to do. So, if the heat was
intense that was just part of the job.
Nesbett felt the heat not only from the close-knit Anchorage
group of the 1950s, but also from new bar admittees. Excited at
being a part of a novel fight between bar and bench, young lawyers
were easily enlisted.
Five days after seizure of the bar's bank account, the Alaska
Bar Association sued the Alaska Supreme Court, Justices Nesbett,
Dimond and Arend and court administrator Thomas Stewart in
federal court. The court tried to enlist the aid of Alaskan counsel
but was unsuccessful. It then turned to George Cochran Doub, a
Baltimore attorney who had been an Assistant Attorney General
in the Eisenhower Administration, and who had helped in the
initial organization of the Alaska court system.
Upon the filing of the federal court case, Nesbett fired off a
press release outlining his version of the events leading up to the
court case:
This entire one-sided controversy centers around the court's
rules on disciplinary procedure, although this would never be
obvious from the objections that are made public by the bar.
The bar of Alaska under territorial status was not under the
control of a court with respect to its self-discipline responsibili-
ties. The result was, discipline was not being enforced. 48
This press release was followed by another alleging that the
bar had been irresponsible with its funds by collecting $20,000 a
year in dues while keeping a check register rather than books of
account. Though Nesbett maintained in his statements to the
public that only a small, volatile portion of the bar was behind the
48. Chief Justice Buell Nesbett, Press Release (July 29,1964) (located in closed
case file for Alaska Bar Ass'n v. Nesbett, No. A-42-64 CIV. (D. Alaska filed July
29, 1964)) (on file with U.S. District Court, D. Alaska).
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controversy, the reality was that nearly every member of the bar
paid a special assessment to fight the case. Most bar members lent
their names to the official case title.
Nesbett directed his attacks at Anchorage, since it was his
belief that Anchorage led the fight. However, by this time it was
not only Anchorage that opposed him; Fairbanks and Juneau
lawyers had also entered the fray. As Robert Ziegler of Ketchikan
recalled, "We were practicing attorneys, we knew what was good
for us, we knew what was bad for us. We likewise knew what was
good for the people we represented and what was bad for the
them. The supreme court in those days was icily aloof."
By August 7, 1964, bar counsel had taken over communica-
tions between the court and the bar. Arthur David Talbot,
retained by the board to represent the bar association, wrote the
court:
[O]ur clients expect to obey as far as is reasonably possible the
rules, orders and writs of the Supreme Court of Alaska affecting
the Alaska Bar Association in the conduct of its affairs, unless
the enforcement of these rules, orders and writs is stayed by the
U.S. District Court, or until the same are vacated or annulled by
a court of competent jurisdiction or the Legislature and people
of Alaska.
Talbot advised the court that his "clients are rendering such
obedience as they are able under protest." The court, taking
Talbot's letter as a sign of conciliation, and noting that the
grievance committees around the state were making their required
reports, promulgated Supreme Court Order No. 72 rescinding the
damning orders that had mobilized the bar. The bar's funds and
files were returned, and the board was permitted to run the bar.
However, returning the funds, fies and bar to their original status
was a unilateral effort for reconciliation. The day the order came
out, Ziegler wrote Nesbett that he still refused to recognize the
validity of the new rules, that he would not resume his former
position as president of the bar under those rules and that it would
be his recommendation that bar officers not accept any funds or
fies from the court. Apparently bar counsel Talbot had not
spoken for Ziegler.
To make matters murkier, Ziegler admonished the court for
bypassing bar counsel when it promulgated Supreme Court Order
No. 72. By this time, the bar had enlisted the aid of Joseph Ball,
a prominent California lawyer who had just been to Alaska for a
bar convention and had so impressed the membership that it asked
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him to be their counsel. Apparently, Ball had not been consulted
about Supreme Court Order No. 72.4 9
The bar realized that if the court returned the funds and files,
its actions would not seem so egregious to the federal court. In a
purposefully haphazard fashion, the bar allowed counsel to set its
strategy, and only a few were informed of the direction. Bar
secretary Kenneth Atkinson remembers feeling like a pawn, getting
no absolute instructions and ending up "sort of winging it." As he
recalled, "They were letting everybody improvise what they were
going to do to see how it came out and if something happened that
was to the advantage of the lawyers that's fine." That strategy was
intended to make it more difficult for the court to deal in any
concrete way with the membership.
In response, the court continued to appeal to the public
through press releases while it antagonized lawyers with seemingly
self-serving case law. In re Houston had given the court power to
admit attorneys, 0 but the court needed another case to show it
had the power to promulgate bar rules. Nesbett went along with
a scheme devised by his attorney, George Cochran Doub. Anchor-
age attorney Harland W. Davis was asked to petition the court to
decide whether it had the power to make rules for governing the
bar association.5 ' Davis, acting in accord with Nesbett's plan,
based his petition on a written memorandum he received from
Doub and the court administrative staff. Members of the bar,
suspicious of Davis's reasons for bringing the petition, swiftly
deposed him. Davis quickly admitted that the petition had been
instigated by Nesbett. 2 Anchorage bar members persuaded Davis
to withdraw the petition, 3 but the court denied Davis's request4
and, in the process, left itself vulnerable to charges of procuring
cases to enhance its own power.
49. Ziegler wrote: "[I]nasmuch as both parties are represented by counsel that
counsel should have been consulted and a stipulation entered into by and between
counsel encompassing whatever points contained in Order No. 72 that counsel
could agree upon." Letter from Robert Ziegler, President, Alaska Bar Associa-
tion, to Buell Nesbett, Chief Justice, Alaska Supreme Court (Sept. 10, 1964).
50. 378 P.2d 644 (Alaska 1963).
51. See In re Alaska Supreme Court Orders No. 64, 68, 69, 70 & 71, 395 P.2d
853 (Alaska 1964) (per curiam).
52. Deposition of Harland W. Davis, In re Alaska Supreme Court Orders (No.
532).
53. In re Alaska Supreme Court Orders, 395 P.2d at 855.
54. Id.
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In the meantime, making clear its intent to handle disciplinary
cases more expeditiously than the bar and demonstrating its
prerogative to be notified of all disciplinary matters whether or not
the bar was acting upon them, the supreme court reopened a
disciplinary case. Neil Mackay, an Anchorage attorney, had been
accused of overcharging a client in the 1950s. In September 1961,
a trial committee of the bar voted two to one to discipline Mackay.
After hearing argument from Mackay's lawyer Wendell Kay, the
board of governors reversed the trial committee and voted to
exonerate Mackay. The board never referred the matter to the
supreme court since it had disposed of the question. However,
Nesbett, while president of the Anchorage bar in the 1950s, had
been notified of the Mackay case and referred the matter to David
Thorsness, chairman of the Alaska bar's grievance committee.
That was the last Nesbett heard of the matter until he received the
report from the grievance committee after the July 23, 1964,
takeover. Nesbett, determining that there was cause to reopen the
case, held a hearing on September 24.
Mackay was represented by Wendell Kay and David Talbot.
Kay, now president of the Anchorage bar, and Talbot, Alaska bar
counsel, both had a special interest in this case. The Mackay case,
the bar must have thought, was a perfect example of the supreme
court's overreaching: it was going into a case of a lawyer already
cleared of any misdeed.
On October 24, 1964, the supreme court issued its per curiam
decision in the Davis case; on October 26, the court disbarred Neil
Mackay; and on October 27, federal judges Walter H. Hodge,
William T. Beeks and Gilbert H.. Jertberg heard the Alaska bar's
case against the court, Alaska Bar Association v. Nesbett.55
Most state bars were integrated under judicial authority. The
power of courts to integrate bars had already been tested and
found valid. Nonetheless, Alaska's special circumstances-a
legislatively created, integrated bar-tempted the federal court to
find that the Alaska Supreme Court could not exercise control over
the bar. Yet, such a decision could set a dangerous precedent,
encouraging bar associations in other jurisdictions to contest judicial
control. For this reason, both the federal court and the American
Bar Association actively encouraged settlement. The American
Bar Association went so far as to provide a mediation team to
55. No. A-42-64 CIV. (D. Alaska flMed July 29, 1964).
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work with the parties.5 6 In December, the supreme court and the
board of governors met for a settlement conference in Juneau.
Before the conference, Anchorage bar members, knowing they
had the favor of the federal court in their fight against the Alaska
Supreme Court, decided to determine if their leverage might
influence the supreme court in Neil Mackay's case. They peti-
tioned for a rehearing, which was granted in early November.
The court and the board of governors entered into a settle-
ment of the federal case before the results of the Mackay rehearing
were made public. On December 18, 1964, a joint press communi-
que reported a settlement between the court and bar that included
state legislation and new bar grievance and admission rules.
Ziegler and Nesbett signed a stipulation to dismiss the case in
federal court pending bar ratification of the settlement.
Jubilant at the general good spirit of the mediation and success
of the bar, which had drawn encouragement during the negotiations
from the federal court's apparent respect for its initial case, Talbot
sent Judge Hodge an exuberant letter:
As you will have observed from the stipulation signed by Justice
Nesbett and Mr. Ziegler, as President of the Alaska Bar
Association, the miracle I thought couldn't happen is now
coming to pass.
In view of the understanding achieved at Juneau as the
result of our conference on December 16, 17, and 18, 1 am happy
to do a complete ffip-flop and say that I cannot now imagine
that the litigation pending before Judge Jertberg, Judge Beeks
and yourself will not be fully settled-although I consider the 45
days estimated in the stipulation to be optimistic indeed.
We plainly owe the forthcoming settlement to the generosi-
ty of the members of the supreme court of Alaska, and I believe
there are many members of the Alaska Bar Association who,
like myself are determined that our supreme court will have no
occasion to regret this settlement, or to fault the Association for
the manner in which it will henceforth discharge the important
responsibility of professional self-government.
Talbot's good cheer was somewhat premature. Ballots were
composed on December 24, 1964, regarding the stipulation at the
conference and mailed out to bar membership on January 15, 1965.
By January 21, the membership ratified the settlement plan and,
56. The mediation team included Dean Alfred J. Schweppe of the University
of Washington Law School, Oregon Supreme Court Justice William M. McAllister
and Washington Supreme Court Justice Hugh J. Rosellini.
57. Letter from Arthur David Talbot to Walter H. Hodge, Judge, U.S. District
Court (Dec. 23, 1964).
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relying on ratification, Ziegler and Nesbett presented a joint
statement to the legislature recommending adoption of the new
rules. On January 29, the board's designated agent received all the
bar's property and assets, and the court rescinded Supreme Court
Order No. 64, the controversial bar rules. The order was to be
replaced by the new rules established at the December mediation,
which were scheduled to go into effect on February 8, 1965. On
January 30, Ziegler wrote Nesbett that lawyer-legislators John
Rader in the House and Howard Pollack in the Senate would
introduce the settlement legislation in the form of Senate Bill 48.
Everything seemed to promise an end to the controversy.
However, on that same late day in January, the supreme court
came down with its final decision in the Mackay case and blew the
settlement apart.
Justice Arend wrote the opinion disbarring Neil Mackay. 8
The Anchorage bar was in an uproar. A meeting of the Alaska
Bar Association to be held in Anchorage was called on short
notice. The meeting, scheduled for February 13, was to reconsider
the December agreement in light of the Mackay decision.
The reopening of the court-bar fight did not have the support
of the entire Alaska bar. Ziegler was loath to do anything that
might make the federal court, the supreme court or the bar
association disavow the favorable Juneau settlement. In an open
letter, Ziegler warned the Anchorage bar not to throw away its
gains over one disciplinary case:
I am not by any stretch of the imagination endeavoring to hurl
a gauntlet in anyone's face, but I would urge you not to take any
action which, in effect, would endeavor to have the Board of
Governors repudiate the agreement which we made in December
of last year and to which we must professionally and ethically
adhere, in my opinion.
Ziegler urged members to go through existing legal channels. The
bar-absent many board members-met in Anchorage on February
13, 1965. Joe Ball, outside counsel to the bar, listened quietly as
Alaska co-counsel George Boney, David Talbot and Wendell Kay
persuaded their colleagues to reject the settlement. Boney, an avid
plaintiff's lawyer and later supreme court justice, took turns with
Kay and Talbot (both of whom had represented Neil Mackay),
explaining how the Mackay decision meant there was no settle-
58. In re Mackay, 416 P.2d 823 (Alaska 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1003
(1966), overruled, 464 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1970).
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ment. Convinced the bar had the sympathies of the federal court,
they assured the lawyers that the Mackay decision would work to
their benefit. Bar members voted to reject the settlement and sent
this resolution to the board of governors for ratification.
The board met in Juneau to consider the resolution. It voted
to discharge David Talbot as counsel, with Ziegler casting the
tiebreaking vote. W.C. Arnold, who sided with Ziegler on that
vote, later told the Anchorage bar that the board had found a
conflict of interest between Talbot's retainer from the board in its
litigation with the supreme court and his acceptance, without
consultation with the board, of a retainer for Neil Mackay, a
defendant before that court.59 Wendell Kay, also counsel for
Mackay, withdrew as bar counsel.'
Convinced that Kay, Talbot and Boney had steamrolled the
convention in Anchorage, the board of governors set aside the
resolution and decided to poll bar members on whether they
favored settlement. On March 12, 1965, ballots were sent out and
the members voted against the settlement agreement. The lawyers
went back to court, arguing that the December negotiations in
Juneau had not been between the board and the supreme court
because the members of the bar, at that meeting had been merely
a negotiating team with no binding authority on the membership of
the bar. While the lawyers argued in court, the legislature passed
Senate Bill 48, implementing the settlement proposal. It was
obvious to some members of the bar-especially those lawyers in
firms, uninterested in Neff Mackay's disciplinary problems-that the
fight had now come down to a quest for revenge in the Mackay
case.
A number of attorneys withdrew as party plaintiffs from the
federal case against the supreme court. Robert Ziegler, one of the
first zealots, withdrew from the case on March 26, 1965. He was
followed in April by Anchorage attorneys John Hughes, Robert
Lowe, John Brubaker and Murphy Clark, all insurance defense and
corporate lawyers. Juneau lawyers Michael Holmes (from
Banfield's firm), Shirley Meuwissen, Gladys Stabler and Doug
Gregg withdrew at the same time. These southeastern lawyers had
ties to court personnel and/or saw no reason to back the outspoken
59. Talbot is Ousted from Bar Case, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 24,1965,
at 1.
60. Id.
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Anchorage bar. The case became a dogfight, and the sacrificial
bone was to be Justice Harry Arend.
Arend wrote the opinion in the Mackay case,61 joined in all
of Nesbett's rulings and refused to answer questions regarding his
participation in the early orders. When he came up for a retention
vote in March, lawyers across the state launched a campaign to
vote him off the bench. In Fairbanks, where Arend had practiced
for years, television spots opposed the judge. In Juneau, attorney
Doug Baily remembered hearing fellow attorneys on the radio
urging people to vote against Arend. In Anchorage, letters went
out to clients advising them of Arend's retention election. The plea
might have begun: "Dear John, I've been your lawyer for a
number of years and you've trusted me with your legal problems.
Let me tell you what this bench-bar fight means to you." The
letter would have discussed the bond for jury trials, which was
perceived as a threat to the right to a jury trial. It would have
complained of an imperious supreme court taking over an indepen-
dent bar. Finally, it would have appealed to the client, as a citizen
living in the new state of Alaska, to vote in the forthcoming
election for justice and an end to Justice Arend's tenure. Arend
made no response.
The claim that he was obstructing access to jury trials in civil
cases particularly hurt Arend. Nesbett later recalled that he told
Arend to do what Nesbett had never done:
"Harry, you wouldn't believe it. The radios and everything are
blasting this out," I said. "I think you should go on and say
something." He said, "No, we're not supposed to do that sort of
thing. A judge is supposed to be stoic and take it." "Well," I
said, "I think it's serious enough to let me go on the air and
explain it." "No," he said, "I don't want you popping into it."
After all, it was Nesbett they were really after.
In March 1965, Harry Arend was the first and only supreme
court justice in the Alaska system ever to lose office in a vote. The
bar had shown its full strength. It had won its last triumph in the
controversy. In July, the federal court, acting on affidavits of the
American Bar Association team that had mediated between the
parties, dismissed without prejudice and without costs the case
against the Alaska Supreme Court. On February 16, 1970, the
exhibits and documents were returned and the case fie closed.
61. See In re Mackay, 416 P.2d at 826.
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Jay Rabinowitz won appointment to the Alaska Supreme
Court, filling Justice Arend's seat. The bar began to have a greater
influence on the court. Many who had been prominent in the
court-bar fight or had supported it in spirit eventually found their
way to the supreme court bench. According to the constitution, the
court could be expanded only at the request of the chief justice. In
1968, Governor Walter Hickel, taking the advice of his attorney
general, Edgar Paul Boyko, forced Nesbett to ask for two more
judges to sit on the supreme court, thereby allowing Alaska's first
Republican governor to appoint members. Nesbett was threatened
with a budget constraint, Boyko later explained, if he did not
request the additional judges. Nesbett remembered no threats.
But relations between Nesbett and Boyko had been strained ever
since Nesbett publicly reprimanded Boyko in a supreme court
opinion.
Nesbett's power base was completely eroded with the appoint-
ment of George Boney, the dogged bar counsel, and Roger
Connor, a liberal lawyer from Juneau. Boney, to dilute Nesbett's
power further and enhance his own, helped institute the concept of
rotating the chief justice position among the justices. This meant
Nesbett would no longer be the only justice to sit on the judicial
council and participate in appointments to the bench.
The federal court refused to follow the example of the state
court and continued to allow Neil Mackay to practice before its
bench. Mackay had a federal practice for a number of years until
the state court, by then virtually packed with plaintiff's lawyers,
came out with a revised version of the Mackay case, reversing the
original decision.62 John Dimond, the only member of the
supreme court besides Nesbett who had voted for the original
disbarment, wrote the opinion for reinstatement while Nesbett was
recovering from extensive injuries suffered in a plane crash.
Nesbett later remarked:
Dimond thought he saw a chance to become chief justice and
that's when he got together and wrote that opinion for the
supreme court saying that they made a mistake in disbarring Neil
Mackay. Then he got Boney, Connor and Rabinowitz to go
along with him on it. It was an illegal decision, it was no
decision for this reason: Connor and Boney, neither one, had
any business participating in this decision when they were never
a member [sic] of the court at the time. Rabinowitz, as soon as
62. In re Mackay, 464 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1970), overruling In re Mackay, 416
P.2d 823 (Alaska 1963), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1003 (1966).
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he came on the court, refused to have anything do with the bar
fight. He said, "I wasn't involved." And he wanted to be liked
by all those lawyers. And he said, "I'm not going to sit on
anything." So, then all the proceedings that went on for a
couple of years, Rabinowitz never participated. But he did in
that decision saying it was a mistake, we shouldn't have done it
and he wasn't even on the court when it was done. Neither was
Connor, neither was Boney. And I was out of that. So that
Dimond was the only one who had authority.... And he didn't
get to be chief justice after all. Boney got it.
The independent mindedness of Nesbett, which alienated him from
the bar, also made it more difficult for him to deal with a supreme
court no longer within his control.
Being a supreme court justice changes a person, Nesbett said.
"It makes you firm. And you [have] got to be.... [Y]ou won't be
the jolly, happy-go-lucky practicing lawyer you were." Taking
Alaska out of the territorial era and into a state court system took
its toll on Nesbett. The decisions he made and actions he took
reflected his mission to provide a reliable and fair justice system for
the people. However, the authoritative manner he brought to the
task put him at odds with many practicing lawyers.
IV. CONCLUSION
The years prior to statehood had seen a bar dominated by the
culture of solo practitioners. Most lawyers worked in isolated
general practices, looking forward to daily luncheons and frequent
phone calls to share accounts of their trials and experiences.
Although the expertise varied among practitioners, a camaraderie
pervaded. Most came to Alaska, just as Nesbett had, to escape the
constraints and conventions of law practice outside. During the
1950s, bar members united on a number of occasions. The Stringer
case brought attorneys together; attorneys spearheaded the drive
to pass the Integrated Bar Act; and they worked on the constitu-
tional convention, actively participating in, among other things, the
drafting of the judiciary article. Although legal practices and
agendas varied, attorneys in the 1950s took a leading role in
shaping not only the framework of their profession but also the
framework of the prospective state of Alaska.
By the end of the 1950s and during the early 1960s, the bar
was becoming less cohesive. More and more lawyers, particularly
in Anchorage, formed partnerships. These lawyers put in long
hours behind their desks. They had less time for bar lunches,
politics and social activities. The first state court system added
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another wrinkle, as members of the small coterie of lawyers were
elevated to the bench.
It was in this atmosphere of change and stratification that
Buell Nesbett presided over the first supreme court. Few lawyers
would disagree with Nesbett's goal to improve the legal system in
order to provide reliability and consistency. What attorneys did not
want, however, was for this improvement to come at the expense
of their own power. However, Nesbett was not content with simply
providing standards of justice upon which lawyers could rely; he
also felt a duty to the people to ensure that the lawyers they paid
to represent them would be competent and efficiently policed. This
was just one more job best undertaken by the new supreme court.
Nesbett was very familiar with the bar he took on when he
promulgated orders to take it over. He knew the faction that
operated on the margins-taking advantage of a less rigorous
territorial system-a faction that preferred backroom politics and
loosely fashioned deals. In many ways, Buell Nesbett's tenure as
the first chief justice demonstrated just how difficult it is for a
person at the cusp of two eras, with a foot in each. He had
practiced with the lawyers he took on. He knew how they fought,
and at times this knowledge brought him closer to their level.
Nesbett also underestimated the power of the bar. The
territory may have changed to a state overnight, but attorneys
practicing law took much longer to change from the territorial
practice to one more similar to their stateside counterparts.
Although a higher level of professionalism was becoming apparent,
the bar was still a powerful unifying force. Nesbett's abrupt effort
to have the bar placed under the control of the judiciary alienated
those who would normally have been favorably disposed to him.
His taking of bar funds, the arbitrary opening of the Mackay case
and the Harland Davis fiasco proved to even the most reasonable
lawyers that their domain was being encroached. The fact that
supreme courts in other states had been integrating bar associations
for years became lost in a conflict over personalities and power
plays.
The court-bar fight was the last time the bar association in
Alaska united. The leaders, older members, shared with their
younger colleagues the romance of the territorial days. The leaders
were able to whip a group of disparate attorneys into a force
fighting for a cause because many had come expecting to be on an
outpost. In the end, the conflict was an expression both of
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Alaska's transition into statehood and of the growing professional
identity of Alaska's lawyers.
